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AVIATION LAW-TORT LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY
ON THE GROUND-RES IPSA LoQUITUR-Plaintiff's fishing vessel was struck
and sunk by a practice bomb released from a Marine Corps aircraft. An
action was brought against the government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.1 Plaintiff could produce no proof of negligence on th~ part of the
government. Held, recovery allowed. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable. Goodwin v. United States, (E.D. N.C. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 445.
Aviation accidents may be broadly classified into two groups: those involving injury to passengers, and those involving injury or damages to
persons 9r property qn the ground. Different theories of liability have been
applied to each of these situations. In passenger cases the courts have generally required proof of negligence on the part -of the owner or _operator of
the aircraft.2 The more recent of these cases have permitted the plaintiff to

128 u.s.c. (1952) §1346(b).
2 Seaman v. Curtis.5 Flying Service, 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N.Y.S. 251 (1930); Johnson
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employ the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.3 In the relatively few common law
decisions involving injury to persons or property on the ground, the theory
of liability has not been completely clear. In most ground damage cases
the courts have allowed the plaintiff to recover without introducing factual
evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. Some ground damage
cases completely avoid the negligence issue and impose liability without
any plea as to the fault of the defendant. Liability in these cases seems to
rest on traditional trespass to land doctrines.4 Under the trespass theory,
any unprivileged entry onto land gives rise to liability.5 In a few ground
damage cases, there is an indication that the court actually has imposed strict
liability for the reason that aircraft are extrahazardous instrumentalities.6
Eminent authorities interpret these cases as resting on extrahazardous instrumentality principles and, in most instances, the writers support the
theory as applied to aviation.7 Some authorities would impose strict liability for policy reasons even if aviation were held to be reasonably safe.8
Some courts, as in the principal case, have applied the rules of ordinary
negligence actions, including the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.9 While in
result consistent with the absolute liability cases, the res ipsa loquitur
decisions are clearly in conflict with at least one of the bases for the imv. Eastern Airlines, (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 713. See generally 6 A.L.R. (2d) 528, n. 5
(1949).
8 Lobel v. American Airlines, (2d Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 217; Hassman v. Pacific
Alaska Air Express, (D.C. Alaska 1951) 100 F. Supp. I. Contra, Morrison v. Le Toumeau
Co. of Georgia, (5th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 339.
4 Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. (N.Y.) 381 (1822): Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y.S. 469 (1933).
5 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 55 (1955).
6 In Rochester Gas & Electric Co. v. Dunlop,, note 4 supra, at 851-852, the court said
that the defendant had committed an "inexcusable trespass" because "common experience
requires the ••• conclusion .•• that no matter how perfectly constructed or how carefully
managed an aeroplane may be, it may still fall•..•" See also D'Anna v. United States,
(4th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 335; Parcell v. United States, (S.D. W.Va. 1951) 104 F. Supp. 110.
7 Professor Bohlen interprets Rochester Gas & Electric Co. v. Dunlop, note 5 supra, as
an application of the strict liability rule derived from Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H.L. 330
(1868). He says: "If .•• aviators are to be required to answer for harm done to groundowners despite the exercise of all conceivable precaution, skill, and care to prevent it, the
liability is imposed because of the peculiar hazards of aviation." Bohlen, "Aviation Under
the Common Law," 48 HARV. L. REv. 216 at 219 (1934). In 3 TORTS RE.5TATEMENT §520,
comment b (1938), aviation is classified as ultrahazardous. (Professor Bohlen was the chief
draftsman of the Restatement.) PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 56 (1955), interprets the Rochester
Gas & Electric case as "strict liability on the basis of trespass" but goes on to say "most of
the other decisions have turned upon the dispute as to whether aviation is to be treated
as an abnormal and excessively hazardous activity...•" Parcell v. United States, note 6
supra, is the only case cited by Prosser which directly involved the issue of whether aviation is extrahazardous. See also Vold, "Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced
Landings on Ground Victims Outside of Established Landing Areas," 5 HAsrmcs L.J. I
(1953).
8 See Vold, "Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings on Ground
Victims Outside of Established Landing Areas," 5 HAsTINcs L.J. I (1953).
9 In addition to the principal case, see United States v. Kesinger, (10th Cir. 1951) 190
F. (2d) 529. The court refused to apply res ipsa Ioquitur in Williams v. United States,
(5th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 473.
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position of liability without fault. The use of res ipsa loquitur amounts
to an assertion that aviation is so safe that an unexplained accident can
best be attributed to negligent conduct.1 Clearly, this principle cannot
be reconciled with the proposition that public policy deems aviation so
dangerous that strict liability should be imposed.11 This apparent conflict may, of course, be explained by attributing to the courts an unawareness of the fact that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and extrahazardous
instrumentality are fundamentally inconsistent.1 2 A more likely explanation is that the courts have never considered aviation to be extrahazardous.13 The imposition of liability without fault in ground damage cases
may be explained simply as the result of classic trespass doctrines or basic
policy considerations.14 The authorities supporting the strict liability
view may well have read more into these decisions than the courts intended
and in so doing have created, on the surface at least, a basic conflict in the
case law. This is not to say that it is erroneous or futile to advocate the
imposition of strict liability in ground damage cases. It has been strongly
urged that absolute liability should be applied in such cases as a result of
pure policy considerations.1 5 A basis for strict liability might also be found
in the trespass to land that is usually present; yet the law of trespass is
changing and the modern view is that no liability is imposed for nonnegligent, unintentional trespass.16 In any case, if absolute liability-the
most desirable theory from plaintiff's standpoint-cannot be justified on
either policy or trespass principles, the plaintiff may plead a negligence

°

10 9

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2509 (1940).
the other hand, the passenger cases which apply negligence principles but refuse
to use res ipsa loquitur are not necessarily inconsistent with the extrahazardous theory. It
is possible to theorize that a passenger assumes the risk of the extra hazard and may
recover only upon showing that negligence has increased the risk. Bohlen, "Aviation
Under the Common Law," 48 HARv. L. REv. 216 (1943). In many recent passenger cases,
however, courts have permitted the plaintiff to plead res ipsa loquitur. Lobel v. American
Airlines, note 3 supra; Rassman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express, note 3 supra. As in the
ground damage cases, this would appear to refute the proposition that aviation is extrahazardous.
12 At least one court seems to be unaware of the inconsistency. See Parcell v. United
States, note 6 supra.
13 One case expressly states that aviation is not extrahazardous. Boyd v. White, 128
Cal. App. (2d) 641, 276 P. (2d) 92 (1954). The language in Rochester Gas &: Electric Co.
v. Dunlop, note 4 supra, may be interpreted as going to the question of whether the trespass of an aircraft in distress is privileged. D'Anna v. United States, note 6 supra, was
decided under a Maryland statute. The language of the court in regard to common law
liability is dictum. In Parcell v. United States, note 6 supra, the court bases liability on
res ipsa loquitur as well as absolute liability principles. This greatly weakens the case as
authority.
14 Parcell v. United States, note 6 supra, will not fit either of these theories, however.
15 Persons on the ground have no direct interest in aviation. Unlike passengers, they
are passive bystanders subjected to the risks of passing aircraft without sharing in the direct
benefits of the activity. See Vold, "Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings
on Ground Victims Outside of Established Landing Areas," 5 HAsnNGs L.J. 1 (1953).
16 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 55 (1955).
11 On

1957]

RECENT DECISIONS

869

action. Courts are often willing to allow the use of res ipsa loquitur,11 and
the principal case evidences the fact that recovery is reasonably certain
under negligence theories aided by the res ipsa doctrine.is
Allan L. Bioff

17 United States v. Kesinger, note 9 supra;
18 See 37 CoRN. L.Q. 543 (1952) indicating

Parcell v. United States, note 6 supra.
that res ipsa loquitur as applied in aviation
accident cases is often tantamount to absolute liability.

